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Abstract 
Central bank plays a key role in an economy of a country in terms of 
conducting monetary policy. But the importance of maintaining an 
adequate level of financial strength for a central bank is subjected to 
controversy believing that being the monetary authority in the 
economy, central banks do not require financial strength. But recently, 
the importance of financial strength even for central banks came to the 
consideration in the event of financial failures of central banks in 
larger economies. Hence, the requisite of central bank financial 
strength in terms of achieving policy objectives particularly the price 
stability which is the key policy objective of majority of central banks 
around the world came to discussion. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the impact of central bank financial strength on price stability 
in South Asian context. Prevailing limited studies on this field have 
been focused on the analysis of central bank financial strength and 
price stability mostly in the context of western countries or as a whole 
for the world. Investigation on South Asian context would give 
different insight to the prevailing debate on the topic since it is 
considered that there is a lower central bank independence within the 
South Asian region which motivated this study. The study has been 
conducted for the time period of 1980 to 2015 and an unbalanced panel 
regression was conducted using central bank financial strength as the 
main independent variable where the consumer inflation as a proxy to 
price stability was the dependent variable. Empirical result of this 
study provides a significant negative relationship between central bank 
financial strength and inflation suggesting a probable impact from 
central bank financial strength on price stability for the selected 
countries within the region.   
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1. Introduction  
The issue of whether central banks require financial strength is neither easy nor 
uncontroversial. The prevailing limited empirical evidence is also conflicting 
which opens up a researchable area on this subject. Accordingly, does central bank 
financial strength matter in maintaining price stability and if so, which type of 
relationship should exist between price stability and central bank financial strength 
is the main consideration which motivates this study with special reference to South 
Asia. 
The concept of central bank financial strength is disregarded for a long 
period of time due to several reasons. It is believed that monetary authority in the 
economy inherent only to central bank provides no more requirement of a financial 
strength (Stella, 2005). Stella claims that unlimited costless ability of central bank 
in creating domestic fiat money trivializes the need of a financial strength for a 
central bank as they can print any quantity of money to repay their obligations as 
well as to absorb the losses. But it is argued that there can be an adverse economic 
impact from printing money unlimitedly which could result conflicts in policy 
objectives especially in terms of price stability. Hence, the argument of even central 
banks requires an adequate level of financial strength to pursue their policy 
objectives freely, comes to the debate. 
 In nature, central banks hardly become illiquid (Benecka et al 2012). Being 
the monopoly issuer, central bank can continue its service even with a negative 
equity which is one of the reasons for the negligence of this concept. Further, the 
formal procedures of standard bankruptcy are not subjected to central banks 
providing no legal binding constraint even with the zero level of equity (Benecka 
et al, 2012). Also, the right to collect seigniorage which is the monetary income of 
central banks make them able to go well beyond the accounting equity which 
undermines the importance of financial soundness in the context of central banks. 
But central bank losses may have long term fiscal implications and they would try 
to control losses with improvements of finances by allowing higher inflation. This 
implies a probable conflicting situation between their primary goal of price stability 
and weak financial strength arising through inflationary means of solving financial 
weaknesses of the central banks. 
It is reviewed that even though central banks can always create money to 
pay its bills and cannot be declared bankrupt by a court, their financial results can 
be an impact in terms of achieving the policy objectives. Therefore, losses or 
negative capital may raise doubts in its ability to deliver policy targets and expose 
it to political pressure (Archer and Boehm, 2013). Therefore, this study is mainly 
motivated by the prevailing research gap in this area by providing a comprehensive 
investigation on the impact of central bank financial strength on price stability in 
South Asian context.  
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2. Research Problem  
Generally, it is accepted that commercial banks require a substantial financial 
strength to survive and to conduct their primary responsibilities. But in the context 
of central banks, the need of financial strength is a controversial area which requires 
further investigation. Both supportive and challenging views and findings can be 
observed in empirical literature giving an insight of prevailing debate on this topic.  
 Prevailing limited studies on this field have focused on the analysis of 
central bank financial strength and price stability mostly in the context of western 
countries or as a whole for the world. Developing economies; specifically, South 
Asia has not been included in many of the empirical analysis suggesting that 
investigation on South Asian context would give different insight to the prevailing 
debate on the topic as a region with lower central bank independence comparatively 
(Ahsan and Skully, 2009). Hence, investigating whether there could be an impact 
from the financial strength of central bank on price stability comes as a researchable 
area which has been disregarded for a longer period of time especially in the South 
Asian context. 
Accordingly, this can be specified into a specific research question as: “Has 
central bank financial strength impacted price stability in South Asia during the 
time period of 1980 to 2015?”  
 
3. Significance and Justification of the Study  
This study will contribute to the prevailing controversy in this field on significance 
of central bank financial strength for an economy. Accordingly, findings of this 
study will conclude the impact of central bank financial strength on price stability 
in the South Asian context. Hence, this study will be significant to the prevailing 
empirical literature providing an empirical investigation in the South Asian context 
with consideration of inherent features of central bank system within the region. 
The available empirical findings on the topic in the South Asian context remain 
scant compared to the studies in the advanced economic context. Hence, the study 
will fill the lacuna of research in the field. 
In addition, the findings of the study will draw attention on the importance 
of the central bank financial strength in maintaining macroeconomic stability in 
terms of price stability and will provide a different insight to policy makers with 
the involvement of the independence of central banks. This study will cover the 
time period ranging from 1980 to 2015 which will provide the most recent analysis 
on the data compared to the previous studies. 
 
4. Research Objectives  
1. To identify the impact of CBFS on price stability in South Asia; and  
2. To identify the impact of other variables on price stability in South Asia.  
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5. Review of Literature  
5.1 Concept of Central Bank Financial Strength 
It can be observed there are different terms which have been used in the related 
literature to refer to central bank finances. For instance, ‘central bank finance,’ 
‘central bank financial position’ are few of the mostly used terms in literature 
(Stella and Lonnberg, 2008; Ize, 2005). Some studies adopt the term ‘financial 
strength’ (Stella, 2005; Cargill, 2005; Klüh and Stella, 2008). In early literature, 
central bank finance has been discussed in the context of central bank independence 
(Perera et al, 2011).  
Accordingly, Central Bank Independence (CBI) has been considered as the 
degree of freedom of the central bank to pursue monetary policy without 
interference from political considerations (Sirivedhin and Hataiseree, 2000; cited 
in Griffin, 2011). The independence consumed by the central banks in pursuing 
monetary policy granted more authority to central banks apart from the government 
authorities which ultimately allow them to make more independent decisions which 
will lead to a more stable economic environment in the respective country 
(Maxfield, 1997; cited in Griffin, 2011). 
Later, the concept of Central Bank Independence (CBI) was broadly 
discussed in many aspects. Among the wide scope of CBI, the financial dimension 
of CBI came to the discussion focusing on the financial strength of central bank 
(Haan and Eijffinger, 2016). Since CBI referred to authority in central banking 
system, Financial authority has drawn the attention as the financial dimension of 
CBI (Hayat and Farvaque, 2011). The financial strength of the central bank has 
been defined in the scope of the ability of central banks to attain its policy goals 
without external financial support (Stella, 2005). 
This study uses the term ‘Central Bank Financial Strength’ (CBFS) 
following the prevailing empirical studies (Klüh and Stella, 2008; Perera et al., 
2011).  
This is a concept which has been neglected previously. There are both historical 
and theoretical reasons for the negligence of CBFS which have been pointed out in 
empirical studies (Stella, 2005). Focusing on historical reasons first, it can be 
observed that many fiat money central banks including Group of Seven (G-7) 
countries had been highly profitable over a long period of time. Therefore ‘financial 
difficulties’ is much more a remote concept to them. It is stated that U.S. Federal 
Reserve System has been making profits since 1915 (Stella, 2005). Hence, being 
profitable ever in the history made the CBFS rather a remote concept. Then, the 
theoretical reasons provide that due to the unlimited costless ability in creating 
money, central banks do not require financial strength as commercial banks.  
In addition, some of empirical studies claim that the ability of central banks 
to print money allows them to recapitalize themselves through seigniorage or 
institutional arrangements with treasury to recapitalize and the consolidated fiscal 
position cause for the negligence of the concept of CBFS. But it is argued that weak 
financial strength of central banks causes the deterioration of the independence 
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considerably which will ultimately affect the effective conduct of monetary policy 
(Mora et al, 2012). 
It is stated that conventional measures of assessing financial strength of 
private enterprises cannot be employed in the context of central bank since 
profitability and capital are not the primary consideration of central bank (Stella, 
2008). It has been as used capital, equity or net worth as traditional accounting 
measurements of corporation’s financial standings which cannot be used in the 
aspect of central banks (Hall and Reis, 2015). Reasons for the unacceptance of 
traditional financial measurements have been listed as; central banks cannot be 
liquidated, central banks do not have a market value since the primary consideration 
is not profit and governments own the central bank with more deposit funds and 
most of the assets of the central bank as government liabilities which make 
confusing distinction between equity-holders and credit-holders in the context of 
central banks (Hall and Reis, 2015). 
Therefore, it is suggested that performance of central banks can be assessed 
through policy performance in particularly success of achieving the monetary 
policy targets. Accordingly, two specific benchmarks have been demonstrated to 
assess central bank performance; firstly, how well it creates conducive conditions 
to ensure favorable macroeconomic outcomes such as output growth, price 
stability, etc. and secondly, how efficiently the central bank achieves such 
outcomes referring to the internal efficiency which minimizes the costs of attaining 
objectives (Stella, 2008). 
A study has highlighted that major shifts in the composition and the size of 
central banks’ balance sheets resulting through large capital inflows in an emerging 
market and increased sensitivity of capital to domestic interest rate movements 
have brought the forefront of policy debate of CBFS and monetary policy conduct 
(Mora et al., 2012).  
In literature it is provided that CBFS distinguishes from the concept of 
central bank capital. Focusing on the concept of central bank capital, technical 
definition can be drawn from the studies as the amount of direct investment of 
shareholders plus accumulated retained earnings minus losses (Stella, 1997; cited 
in Perera et al., 2011). But it is stated that the capital is not a representative 
measurement of CBFS as it can be a misleading summery statistic mainly due to 
three reasons such as dependency on accounting and profit distribution methods, 
existence of off balance sheet items and improperly stated profits (Stella, 2008). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that financial strength matters more compared to the 
capital for central banks. Hence, it should be noted that capital and financial 
strength are clearly distinguished in the context of central banks. 
Literature consider ‘Net worth’ as a much more useful indicator of potential 
profitability and financial independence of central banks. ‘Broadly, net worth is 
defined as the price of a fully informed risk neutral investor would pay to purchase 
the bank under normal conditions’ (Stella, 1997; cited in Perera et al, 2011:9). In 
other words, net worth reflects the franchise value of central bank which is the value 
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after consideration of ability of printing money and imposing reserve requirements 
on commercial banks (Bindseil et al, 2004; cited in Perera et al, 2011).  
Even though central bank profit and losses are considered as less important 
measurements of CBFS, it can erode the central bank net worth negatively (Dalton 
and Dziobek, 2005; cited in Perera et al., 2011). It is suggested that if central bank 
is able to conduct its operations without incurring operational losses, it can be said 
that it is a financially strong central bank (Cargill, 2006; cited in Perera et al, 2011). 
Therefore, profit and losses of central banks also come to the consideration as they 
determine the central bank net worth level. Hence, profit and losses of central banks 
help to conceptualize the CBFS. Accordingly, central bank net worth provides a 
useful benchmark to examine the central bank balance sheet as it is considered a 
superior indicator of central bank profitability than capital. 
In accordance with empirical views related to CBFS, it can be clarified that 
CBFS as an extension to CBI which is essentially required to carry out smooth 
functioning of monetary policy conduct by central banks. Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that CBFS is an important phenomenon in the context of central banks 
based on the related empirical literature. 
 
5.2 Measuring Central Bank Financial Strength 
Literature provides some useful measurements in assessing CBFS. Accordingly, 
some of the widely employed measurements of CBFS can be identified in several 
studies in terms of ratios (Klüh and Stella,2008; Benecka et al, 2012). Several ratios 
have been employed to assess CBFS with respect to balance sheets of central banks 
such as the ratio of Equity to total assets (ETA), the ratio of ‘broadly defined’ 
capital to total assets (CBFS) and the ratio of Net non-interest bearing liabilities 
(NNIBL) etc. Especially NNIBL has shown a significant negative coefficient with 
inflation providing that there is an impact of CBFS to inflation while other 
measures turned out to be insignificant (Benecka et al, 2012). 
In terms of profitability measures, return on average assets (ROAA) and 
Return on average equity (ROAE) have been used as indicators reflecting net 
returns generated on central bank assets and the profitability of central bank’s own 
funds (Benecka et al, 2012). The ratio of ‘broadly defined’ capital to total assets 
(CBFS) has been widely used in the empirical studies (Stella, 2008; Perera et al, 
2011; Benecka et al, 2012). It has been constructed by taking into account the 
central bank capital or equity plus the balance of ‘Other Item Net’ (OIN) account 
scaled by total assets of central bank. It is stated that the measurement 
comparatively reflects more of central bank balance sheet. It is mentioned that OIN 
includes the revaluation account, net worth, original capital, reserves and physical 
assets. Further, it is stated that it contains accumulated losses or hidden reserves 
providing a reflection of financial strength in the context of central banks (Perera 
et al, 2011). 
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Empirical studies claimed the above mentioned measurement as the best 
representative measurement of CBFS based on several few key features of the 
measurement such as it is a more transparent proxy of measurement, it adopts the 
stock concept to measure CBFS and it is a more reliable indicator which is 
calculated based on the data provided by International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
(Stella, 2005; Stella, 2008; Benecka et al, 2012). Also it has been selected as the 
only measurement which indicates a significant relationship with economic 
outcomes after a comprehensive analysis by employing several measurements in a 
study (Perera et al, 2011). 
Relying on a standardized and widely available data set that ensures 
comparability across countries and using Total Assets as the scaling factor which 
helps to capture the degree of currency mismatches in the central bank’s balance 
sheet have been pointed out as the prominent advantages of this measurement.  
Moreover, it is stated that this is a broad measure of capital to assets which is widely 
available on relatively high standardized and high frequency basis which has been 
employed in previous studies (Mora et al, 2012). 
 
Accordingly, this measurement can be depicted as follows. 
CBFS =
Equity + Other Item Net
Total Assets
 
 
Despite the advantages of this measure, some of the drawbacks also have 
been discussed as failing to capture market value of some assets and liabilities, 
overlooking certain financial components such as contingent liabilities that only 
materialize with a lag and inclusion of idiosyncratic features in Other Item Net 
which might not be fully comparable across countries (Mora et al, 2012). In this 
study, it is used as the ratio of capital plus OIN as a percentage of total assets to 
assess the financial strength of central banks in the selected sample of countries 
following related empirical studies (Klüh and Stella, 2008; Perera et al, 2011; Mora 
et al, 2012). 
 
5.3 Consequences of Central Bank Financial Strength 
Empirical studies present different viewpoints related to CBFS and its impact on 
economic outcomes. Accordingly, majority of scholars highlight the CBFS and its 
relation with attainment of monetary policy objectives to discuss the consequences 
of CBFS.    
It is stated that weak CBFS can hamper policy capacity and its outcomes 
(Stella, 2008).  Further, it is mentioned that weak CBFS can constrain the smooth 
conduct of monetary policy thereby resulting a dependency on the support from 
treasuries. Then, it would affect the primary concern on price stability and ‘to 
compromise its operational independence and also to impose inefficient restrictions 
on the financial system to suppress inflation’ (Stella, 1997; cited in Perera et al, 
2011: 16). It is argued that central bank losses may influence the central bank to 
change the operations of central banking to guarantee its survival (Sweidan, 2011; 
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cited in Perera et al, 2011). Therefore, it is appeared to be that CBFS is positively 
associated with good policy performance which implies that financially weak 
central banks would undermine the macroeconomic stability (Stella, 2008).  
Moreover, it is described that financial weakness of central bank would lead 
to financial losses which have to be settled through financial repression, reserve 
money creation or debt issuance which will results a monetary expansion in the 
economy (Stella, 2005). If central bank fails to withstand potential shocks in their 
balance sheets due to the weak financial position, it would be difficult to fulfill its 
policy obligations which would weaken the credibility of central banks.  
Another idea developed regarding the CBFS is that it is required to maintain 
adequate level of financial strength to absorb losses and to credibly achieve policy 
objectives. It is argued that treasury support for central bank is not an appropriate 
and reliable option and also it cannot be expected such support on timely basis 
considering historical occasions. Moreover, it is emphasized that central bank 
distress and fiscal distress are associated (Stella 2008). Also, stabilizing the 
financial strength with treasury support requires transferring real resources to 
central bank. Such options could cause monetary expansion which would erode 
central bank capital, thereby generating higher inflation rates (Stella, 1997; cited in 
Perera et a., 2011).  
All these findings conclude that to achieve policy objectives as well as to maintain 
efficiency in central banking, it is a necessity to have an adequate level of financial 
strength for central banks. It would be unable to meet the basic functions of central 
banks causing financial distress in the economy due to inadequate CBFS (Stella 
and Lonnberg, 2008).  
Other key aspect of CBFS is that it provides central banks to act more 
credibly. Having an adequate level of financial strength provides central banks to 
survive in adverse situations without hampering policy objectives. It is stated that 
if central banks are financially weak one of the options available to central banks 
is relieving some policy goals such as price stability or maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate which constrain macroeconomic stability (Stella, 2005).  
Finally, it can be concluded that determining financial strength of a central 
bank requires a careful analysis both in balance sheet and economic environment 
to ensure that the central bank will be able to meet its policy objectives successfully 
without hampering macroeconomic stability (Stella, 2005).  
 
5.4 Linking Central Bank Financial Strength and Price Stability 
It is commonly believed that high and volatile inflation affect consumption and 
investment decisions which ultimately result in an impact to the economy as a 
whole. Persistent inflation in goods and services creates higher social costs. 
Accurate predictions of inflation could also enable the Central Bank to conduct its 
monetary policy effectively and efficiently and thereby achieving the objective of 
price stability (Rathnasiri, 2011). 
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Majority of central banks set price stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy believing it to be a crucial pre condition of the smooth functioning 
of the economy. Hence, it can be observed in the monetary system making the 
central bank an agent with the mandate and reputation for maintaining price 
stability. Governments often pass laws and follow customs granting their central 
banks authority and authority to pursue price stability making the central bank an 
agency with the mandate and reputation for maintaining price stability (Cukierman 
et al, 1992). 
Linking price stability with CBFS opens both empirical and theoretical 
arguments. This is an area which is subject to debate. According to literature, many 
scholars argue that the linkage between CBFS and macroeconomic outcomes 
including price stability as a prominent macroeconomic variable are unlikely to 
exist providing that this is an irrelevant idea to investigate. But it has been presented 
as two approaches such as pragmatic approach and theoretical consideration to link 
these two concepts (Klüh and Stella, 2008).  
According to pragmatic approach, the discussion on CBFS and inflation are 
carried out. It is stated that financial difficulties of central bank would weaken the 
achievements of anti-inflationary policies resulting transfer of excess liquidity to 
financial system. It is stated that ‘motives such as self-interested behavior of central 
bank representatives in terms of reputation, personal prestigious and future 
employment opportunities and also, intentions to generate stable flow of seignorage 
revenues can lead to a tendency to factor CBFS in monetary policy decisions’ 
(Perera et al, 2011: 13). In theoretical considerations, it is provided that in 
circumstances where treasury support is not available for a loss making central 
bank, it would tend to lower the cost of monetary operations as the first option 
adjusting minimum reserve requirements. It is discussed that such procedures 
would involve some economic costs such as financial repression affecting the 
financial development (Klüh and Stella, 2008). 
Moreover, it is argued that if the central bank goes for a reprinting of money 
based on interest free liabilities to repay its obligation as the second option, excess 
liquidity would flow to the economy. If sterilization process is not conducted to 
absorb the excess liquidity back, then there could be a possibility of inflationary 
pressures (Perera et al, 2011). On the other hand, if central bank sterilizes the excess 
liquidity by issuing debt securities, it would have to be incurred as an additional 
interest cost (Klüh and Stella, 2008).  
In sum, all these arguments support the view of existing relationship 
between CBFS and price stability. Accordingly, this study will attempt to model 
the relationship in between CBFS and price stability in the South Asian context to 
fill the prevailing research gap. 
 
5.5 Selection of Variables 
By following the previous empirical literature on CBFS, a set of explanatory 
variables is included in the model. Prior to selecting these additional explanatory 
variables, a plethora of previous studies has been referred. For example, in prior 
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literature, inflation has been regressed using a broad range of explanatory variables 
including broad money growth, per capita income, budget deficit, output gap, 
nominal interest rates, nominal exchange rates, economic openness, import prices, 
foreign inflation, oil and/or commodity prices, expected inflation, etc (Moser 1995; 
Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; Perera et al, 2011; Perera et al, 2013). 
 
6. Methodology 
6.1 Research Design and Sample Selection 
The main purpose of this research is to empirically analyze the relationship between 
central bank financial strength and price stability within a framework of panel data 
with special reference to South Asia. Therefore, this research is conducted as a 
quantitative research where data collection methods and techniques follow a 
quantitative research design.  
South Asia is the targeted population for this study. Out of the total 
population of eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, 
Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, only four countries were selected as the sample 
mainly based on the availability and accessibility of data. Accordingly, Sri Lanka, 
India, Pakistan and Nepal were the selected countries within the region. Hence, a 
purposive sampling method was employed to select the countries out of the total 
population. 
 
6.2 Selection of Other Variables 
In the presence of wide range of explanatory variables to inflation, the step-wise 
regression method was used to justify the selection of most appropriate variables 
that can be included in the regression model to keep the model less complex and to 
provide better focus on inflation and CBFS. Accordingly, only Broad Money 
Growth, Foreign Inflation and first lag of dependent variable have been utilized to 
the model following similar studies and after comparing the results of other 
explanatory variables (Perera et al, 2011; Perera et al, 2013). 
 
6.3 Conceptual Framework 
Variables used in the model and their measurement are indicated by the conceptual 
framework. Other than to the main independent variable; central bank financial 
strength several other explanatory variables have been included to the model to 
enhance the model validity. The dependent variable; price stability has been 
measured by using consumer inflation as a proxy to price stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the Study 
 
Measurement   Independent Variables  Dependent 
Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Compiled by authors, 2017 
 
 
6.4 Data Sources and Data Collection 
Since this study is analyzing the macro economic variables, secondary data were 
used to conduct the study. All the variables are expressed as annual percentages 
except the main independent variable which is in the form of ratio. The required 
data was retrieved from various sources such as International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of International Monetary Fund, World Development Indicators of World 
Bank and also from respective central banks, Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and Nepal Rastra Bank 
(NRB).  
These data consist four South Asian countries; Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan 
and Nepal. Unbalanced panel data regression was carried down due to the 
unavailability of data for two countries namely Pakistan and Nepal where central 
bank capital and other item net account balance in IFS database were not published 
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CPI inflation 
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(2010=100) at time t-1 
Consumer inflation 
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after 2007 and 2008 respectively. Accordingly, unbalanced panel data with one 
hundred and twenty-nine observations altogether were used to conduct the analysis 
and the detailed breakdown of the date set was depicted by the following table. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Panel Data Series 
Country Time period Number of observations 
Sri Lanka 1980-2015 36 
India 1980-2015 36 
Nepal 1980-2008 29 
Pakistan 1980-2007 28 
 Total 129 
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017 
 
6.5 Model Specification for the Study 
Since there is no particular theoretical model to adopt in this study, the model was 
specified to best fit to the data set where researcher was given the freedom to alter 
the model where needed. Accordingly, the model was constructed following the 
empirical model by Perera et al. (2011, 2013). 
 
Model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is Consumer inflation over given period t.  𝑋𝑖𝑡corresponding to variables, 
which can have an effect on Consumer inflation: independent variables. Therefore, 
the equation can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑪𝑷𝑰_𝑰𝑵𝑭 =∝ +𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑩𝑭𝑺 + 𝜷𝟐𝑩𝑴_𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑷𝑰_𝑶𝑬𝑪𝑫
+ 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑷𝑰_𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Where, 
CPI_INF            = Year on year change of consumer price index 
CBFS                 = Central Bank Financial Strength 
BM_GROWTH =Broad money growth 
CPI_OECD        = Foreign inflation 
CPI_INF t-1        = Lagged value of CPI_ INF (dependent variable) 
 
 
7. Data Presentation and Analysis  
Prior to the estimation of the model, the data set was adjusted to the unit root 
problem following Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test 
statistics. Accordingly, all the variables have been converted into first order 
integration. 
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7.1 Estimation Results 
𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐹 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐵𝐹𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑀_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Accordingly, pooled regression model was constructed using period weights and 
white period coefficient covariance to improve the model. The significance of the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable was 
assessed by the following criteria: 
 
7.2 Significance of Parameter 
H0: There is no significant relationship in between the two variables 
H1: There is a significant relationship in between the two variables  
Decision Rule: Reject H0 if P value < 0.05 
The results are summarized by the following table. 
 
Table 2: Significance of Parameters of the Model 
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017 
 
 
7.3 Overall Significance of the Model 
To assess the overall significance of the model, following decision criteria was 
used. 
H0: The model is not significant as a whole 
H1: The model is significant as a whole 
Decision Rule: Reject H0 if P value < 0.05 
In accordance with the test statistics, the model was significant as a whole.  
 
Table 3: Overall Significance of the Model 
Probability of F 
statistic 
Level of 
significance 
Conclusion 
0.0000 0.05 The model is significant as a 
whole 
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017 
Variable Coefficient P value Level of 
significance 
Conclusion 
Constant -0.001388 0.2878   
CBFS -0.009622 0.0001 0.05 The relationship is 
significant  
BM_GROWTH -0.043010 0.0000 0.05 The relationship is 
significant 
CPI_OECD 0.436569 0.0806 0.05 The relationship is 
not significant 
CPI_INFt-1 -0.234612 0.0000 0.05 The relationship is 
significant 
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Other test statistics of the model are summarized as follows: 
 
Table 4: Other Test Statistics of the Model 
R2 Adjusted R2 S.E. of Regression Durbin Watson 
Stat 
0.4769 0.4589 0.0417 2.31 
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017 
 
According to the empirical results, it can be observed a significant negative 
relationship in between central bank financial strength and price stability in South 
Asia which is compatible with most of the empirical studies. According to the 
model, a positive change of 1 percent in central bank financial strength, ceteris 
paribus, will result a 0.96 percent decrease of inflation level in selected South Asian 
countries at the presence of other explanatory variables. In other words, when the 
financial strength of central bank increases, the inflation level tends to decline 
which will ultimately result price stability as a macroeconomic outcome. 
In assessing the overall significance of the model, F value is considered 
which appeared to be significant. R2 and Adjusted R2 values are significant with 46 
percent of explanatory power of the variance in the model.  
 
 
The model for the study can be specified based on the empirical results as 
follows: 
CPI_INF = -0.0014 - 0.0096 CBFS – 0.043 BM_GROWTH + 0.4366      
CPI_OECD – 0.2346 CPI_INFt-1 
 
 
8. Conclusion and Recommendation  
This study attempts to provide evidence of probable relationship between central 
bank financial strength and price stability in the South Asian context. The empirical 
result of the study proves that price stability, measured by inflation is broadly 
related to central bank financial strength in particularly a significant negative 
relationship. Therefore, it is concluded that higher financial strength of central 
banks will tend to lower the inflation providing stability in the prices of an 
economy. 
The findings of this study is compatible with the previous similar studies in 
this field. Accordingly, significant negative relationship between Inflation and 
CBFS has been proven by several other studies (Stella 2005; Klüh and Stella 2008; 
Perera et al, 2011; Perera et al, 2013). 
These empirical observations offer several policy implications stressing the need 
of the financial soundness regardless of the monetary authority inherent to central 
banks. Accordingly, central banks should attempt to avoid losses by implementing 
appropriate policies in order to maintain favorable balance sheet position with 
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adequate financial health as there is a significant impact from the financial strength 
of central banks on price stability which generates a downward bias in inflation. 
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